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Abstract 
 International labor mobility is currently heavily restricted by tight immigration 
controls around the world, and most people who want to migrate in search of 
employment and higher wages are either unable to or must do so illegally. This study 
questions whether modern immigration restrictions are effective or economically 
beneficial to either sending or receiving countries. This study assesses the economic and 
social benefits and drawbacks of greater international labor mobility for the world, and 
the U.S. in particular. It focuses on temporary labor migration of low-skilled workers 
from the developing world to the developed world, and argues that increasing this type 
of migration could promote the development of the developing world far more than 
current international aid and trade flows. Furthermore, greater international labor 
mobility benefits all countries that participate. The U.S., specifically, has much to gain 
from developing formal bilateral and multilateral migrant labor agreements with 
developing countries, in particular Mexico. The economic and social benefits of 
widening legal avenues for migrant labor far outweigh potential costs, such as 
suppressed wages of low-skilled citizens. Policymakers in the developed world should 
reconsider the effectiveness of restrictive immigration policies and militarized borders, 
and they should strongly consider the economic growth that could be realized by 
establishing formal, well-enforced migrant labor programs with developing countries. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 The aim of this study is to assess the economic and social benefits and 
drawbacks of greater international labor mobility for the world, and the U.S. in 
particular, and determine how it can best be achieved. This study focuses on temporary 
labor migration of low-skilled workers and argues that increasing this type of migration 
could promote the development of the developing world even more than existing 
international aid and trade flows. In addition, greater labor mobility between the 
developed and developing worlds is not a zero sum game. All parties who play reap 
rewards for doing so. The rewards come in many forms, such as increased labor 
efficiency and economic growth for developed countries, and larger remittance flows 
and skills acquisition for developing countries. International labor mobility is currently 
heavily restricted by tight immigration controls, and most people who want to migrate 
in search of employment and higher wages either cannot or must do so illegally. This 
study argues that developed countries should lower their barriers to immigration and 
create bilateral or multilateral migrant labor agreements with developing countries in 
order to facilitate greater labor mobility between them.  
 I begin the paper by defining the concept of international labor mobility and 
detailing the largest economic and social benefits of international labor mobility to both 
sending and receiving countries. The benefits to the developing world stem from 
gaining larger flows of remittances, which fund development and reduce poverty at the 
individual, family and community level. The developed world, in turn, benefits from 
greater labor market efficiency and economic growth, without the worry of increased 
welfare spending. International migrants benefit by having wider access to safe, legal 
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avenues for temporary labor migration. The opportunity to migrate legally allows them 
to avoid the dangers of crossing borders and living in fear of deportation, and it can also 
offer greater legal protection against exploitation by employers. Additionally, since 
global climate change is an increasingly important issue, I argue that widening 
international migrant labor flows could help some of the poorer, more vulnerable 
communities in the developing world afford adaptive responses, community 
development, and, in worst-case scenarios, relocation. I also address potential 
drawbacks and common misconceptions associated with labor migration, and either 
refute these or argue that they can be readily mitigated. While increased international 
labor migration may not be the perfect solution to ending poverty, inequality, and 
injustice in the world, it can certainly help generate wealth, restore some equality, and 
make the world a fairer, freer place to live. 
 In the third chapter, I narrow my analysis of international labor mobility to the 
U.S. and Mexico. I assess the specific economic and social benefits of labor migration 
between these two countries. I discuss their historical ties and detail the current 
problems of the U.S.’s very restrictive immigration policies and border militarization, 
and the paradoxical growth in undocumented migration from Mexico to the U.S. in the 
past few decades despite the U.S.’s increasingly strict policies. The wage differential 
between the two countries as well as the U.S.’s demand for Mexican labor encourages 
migrants to attempt ever more dangerous and costly border crossings. Existing labor 
immigration programs in the U.S. are far too small to incorporate the millions of 
undocumented Mexican migrants currently living in the U.S. I argue that the U.S. and 
Mexico should establish a well-regulated guest worker program that includes most 
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undocumented migrants. Such a program would help American firms stay informed of 
foreign labor supply, and would also offer migrants legal status, protection of rights, 
and freedom from the fear of deportation. 
 In the fourth chapter, I stress the human side of the issue of international labor 
mobility by revealing the dangers and injustice imposed by current immigration 
restrictions. I continue to focus on Mexico and the U.S., detailing the experiences of 
documented and undocumented migrants alike. I find that both are commonly exploited 
by their employers and work the most dangerous, dirty, and degrading jobs, often 
without proper protections, medical care, or decent compensation. In essence, the 
current U.S. immigration laws and policies force many migrants to migrate illegally, 
live under the specter of deportation, and work for exploitative employers. The relative 
few who can enter legally still face exploitation, and the rights and entitlements they are 
legally guaranteed are far from adequately enforced. I argue that the U.S. can either 
revamp and expand its existing labor migration program, or toss it and create an entirely 
new, well-regulated guest worker program. To understand how the U.S. can best 
accomplish this task, I describe the successful migrant labor programs in New Zealand 
and Canada, noting positive aspects that the U.S. should incorporate into its own 
program. 
 I hope that this study will encourage policymakers to strongly consider pursuing 
bilateral and multilateral agreements establishing migrant labor programs between 
developing and developed countries, in the U.S. and beyond. Further, I hope 
policymakers will reconsider the effectiveness of restrictive immigration policies and 
militarized border control, and recognize their negative impacts on migrant laborers and 
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the global economy. Although developing effective, well-enforced migrant labor 
programs is far from an easy task, the shared economic gains that can be had from 
greater international labor mobility assure us that it is well worth the effort. 
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Chapter II: International Labor Mobility as the New Aid to the 
Developing World 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the concept of international labor 
mobility, and then lay out the monetary and social benefits of increased international 
labor mobility to migrants and their home countries as well as to receiving countries. It 
is important to stress that greater labor mobility is not a zero sum game or a form of 
charity to developing countries. Unlike foreign aid, temporary labor migrants provide 
direct economic gains to every party involved through, for instance, greater efficiency 
in the labor market and more remittances. This chapter also addresses the increasingly 
pressing issue of climate change, arguing that freer labor mobility could play a 
significant role in improving the developing world’s capacity to adapt, prepare for, and 
withstand the increasingly dire threats posed by the changing climate.  
International Labor Mobility 
The International Organization for Migration defines international labor 
mobility as “the movement of people from one country to another for the purpose of 
employment.”1 This movement can result in either temporary or permanent residence in 
a receiving country; however, this paper focuses specifically on the economic 
possibilities offered by increasing temporary labor migration between countries.
2
  
                                                          
 
1
 “Labor Migration,” International Organization for Migration, <https://www.iom.int/labour-migration>. 
2
 The focus on increasing temporary as opposed to permanent labor migration stems from its greater 
political feasibility. For instance, temporary labor migration programs allow countries to control and 
monitor the number of labor migrants they accept, their duration, the services they have access to, and the 
occupations they can apply for. Temporary status also assures that migrants will not pose a fiscal burden 
or permanently alter the social composition of society. For these and other reasons which will be 
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International labor migration is not new on the global scene, although it has 
grown significantly in recent decades. Since 1965, the number of international migrants 
has more than doubled.
3
 Although more people than ever before are now living outside 
their country of birth, up from 175 million in 2000 to 232 million in 2013, according to 
the UN Population Division they account for only 3.2 percent of the world’s 
population.
4
 Almost two-thirds of international migrants live in Europe and Asia, with 
each continent receiving about 70 million migrants each.
5
 Also, about three-quarters of 
migrants are of working age, and 48 percent are women.
6
 However, according to a 
Gallup poll conducted between 2009 and 2011, an additional 640 million people, or 13 
percent of the world’s adults, say they would emigrate permanently if given the 
chance.
7
 Consequently, it is not very surprising that international migration is 
anticipated to continue increasing into the future.  
Of the world’s 244 million international migrants, 150 million are migrant 
workers, as of 2015.
8
 International migrants are driven to seek employment and security 
abroad by a wide variety and interplay of forces, including globalization, local and 
regional conflicts, income disparities, shifts in demographic trends, and climate change. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
discussed, temporary labor migration can be regarded as more politically and socially realistic and worthy 
of consideration and promotion. 
3
 “Labor Markets: International Migration,” The World Bank, <http://go.worldbank.org/ET5UILQKR0>. 
4
 Ted Thornhill, “More People Than Ever Living Outside Their Home Country: Number of Migrants 
Worldwide Hits 232 Million,” September 12, 2013, Daily Mail, 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2418902/More-people-living-outside-home-country-Number-
migrants-worldwide-hits-232-million.html>.  
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Jon Clifton, “150 Million Adults Worldwide Would Migrate to the U.S.,” April 20, 2012, Gallup, 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/153992/150-million-adults-worldwide-migrate.aspx>.  
8
 “Labor Migration,” International Labor Organization, <http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-
migration/lang--en/index.htm>. 
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They contribute to their recipient countries’ economic growth and development, while 
simultaneously supporting the economies of their home countries through remittances 
and human capital acquisition.  
Although establishing and monitoring formal temporary labor migration 
channels between countries would certainly generate many challenges, particularly 
regarding governance, workers’ rights and protection, and international cooperation, the 
potential benefits that would be gained from doing so are extraordinary. In 2011, 
migrant workers earned $440 billion, and the World Bank estimates that more than 
$350 billion of those earnings were sent home to developing countries as remittances.
9
 
If more of the world’s population was able to migrate in search of higher paying jobs, 
these gains would multiply.  
It is worth noting that the demand for greater migration is readily apparent. After 
surveying 135 countries between 2007 and 2009, Gallup concluded that approximately 
16% of the world’s adults, or 700 million people, would like to move permanently to 
another country if the chance presented itself, with the U.S. as the most preferred 
destination, followed by many European countries.
10
 About 150 million of these people, 
or almost one in every 30 adults in the world, would like to move to the U.S.
11
 The 
                                                          
 
9
 “Labor Migration,” International Organization for Migration. 
10
 Neli Esipova and Julie Ray, “700 Million Worldwide Desire to Migrate Permanently,” Gallup, 
November 2, 2009, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-million-worldwide-desire-migrate-
permanently.aspx>. 
11
 “Labor Migration,” ILO. 
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regions with the highest percentages of those wishing to emigrate were the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa.
12
  
When it comes to measuring the potential gains of greater labor migration, 
Michael Clemens, a development economist and a senior fellow at the Center for Global 
Development in Washington, D.C., has conducted analysis that “suggests that the gains 
from reducing emigration barriers are likely to be enormous, measured in tens of 
trillions of dollars.”13 In addition, Clemens’ research suggests that the gains of 
removing all remaining barriers to trade and capital flows would be less than the gains 
from eliminating barriers to labor mobility.
14
 These immense potential gains are made 
possible by unfathomably wide wage gaps between developed and developing countries 
for identical, low-skill workers. For instance, the wage gap between the United States 
and countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Haiti exceeds 1,000 percent.
15
 Such an 
extreme difference in earnings presents probably one of the strongest pull factors ever 
to exist. 
Despite its potential benefits and widespread demand for it, labor mobility in 
general, whether temporary or permanent, is currently heavily restricted by immigration 
policies in the developed world, where relatively high-wage, low-skill jobs are 
concentrated.
16 
The poorest, unskilled workers of the world are denied legal access to 
                                                          
 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 25.3 (2011): 87. 
14
 Ibid., 85-6. 
15
 Ibid., 87. 
16
 James Hollifield, Philip Martin, and Pia Orrenius, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 3
rd
 
ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 5-8. 
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these jobs, which to them and their families may mean the difference between a life of 
extreme poverty and one of relative economic stability and upward mobility. 
Furthermore, unsurmountable legal barriers induce many would-be legal labor migrants 
to pursue the extremely dangerous path of illegal immigration, which paradoxically is 
informally tolerated by many governments for the sake of having a continuous supply 
of cheap labor even while they officially condemn and deport so-called “illegal 
aliens”.17  
Lifting at least some of the barriers to international labor mobility is a necessary 
way to create highly demanded legal avenues for migration and to reverse the trend of 
increasing global income inequality between rich and poor countries, as well as reduce 
income inequality among individuals within countries.
18
 Note that the emphasis here 
rests upon opening the developed world’s borders to the migration of the developing 
world’s low-wage, unskilled workers. After all, the other side of spectrum does not face 
the same barriers, since highly skilled immigrants are already more widely permitted to 
migrate, and even where their access is also strictly limited, increasing their access to 
the developed world is not nearly as politically contentious as opening the borders to 
unskilled labor.  
Increasing international labor mobility is particularly exigent because existing 
levels of international trade and aid are grossly insufficient in supporting the 
                                                          
 
17
 Patrick Taran and Eduardo Geronimi, “Globalization, Labor and Migration: Protection is Paramount,” 
ILO International Migration Program (2002): 7. 
18
 Amina Mohammed, “Deepening Income Inequality,” World Economic Forum, < 
http://reports.weforum.org/outlook-global-agenda-2015/top-10-trends-of-2015/1-deepening-income-
inequality/>. 
 
 
10 
 
development and growth of the developing world. Remittances could have a much 
larger impact in this arena. In general, one of the more ambitious, while still possibly 
politically feasible proposals would establish a global, multilateral guest-worker 
program established and monitored by a new or existing international organization. This 
program could put millions of the world’s poorer and more disenfranchised people to 
work wherever low-skill labor is demanded in the developed world. However, bilateral 
temporary labor migration deals negotiated between neighboring or historically 
affiliated countries are probably much more politically realistic in the short to medium 
term. Many already exist, including between the Gulf states and South and South East 
Asian countries as well as between New Zealand and some small island states. 
Whatever the method, increasing remittances to the developing world would 
economically empower individuals, families, communities, countries, and regions by 
injecting remittances directly into families’ pockets and providing them with the means 
to build their homes and communities, invest in human capital and new businesses, 
learn new skills, and aspire for a better future. 
  In regards to poverty, the liberalization of global labor markets could make 
much larger strides in the reduction of poverty and the fostering of development in the 
developing world compared to foreign aid, which has proven insufficient and often 
disappointingly ineffective. Aid has failed to break the “endless cycle of poverty” in 
developing countries. One critique of foreign aid is that it acts as an opiate for the 
developing world “by subsidizing political irresponsibility and pernicious policies.”19 
                                                          
 
19
 James Bovard, “The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis 65 (1986): 2. 
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Another critique is that donors are unaware of the most productive potential projects 
and therefore fail to invest in them, which leads to the misallocation of precious 
resources and ultimately the undermining of economic growth.
20
 In 2014, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee spent about $135 billion on official development assistance, 
which was less than previous years, and it also allocated 16% less to least-developed 
countries compared to 2013.
21
 The OECD’s trend of favoring middle-income 
developing states over the poorest states is disconcerting, even though it does not apply 
to all international institutions. Meanwhile, a study by Mukand (2012) estimated that 
liberalizing immigration restrictions by just 3% could yield global economic gains of 
over $150 billion.
22
 Even a modest increase of temporary, low-skilled labor migration 
between the poor and rich countries of the world could have a larger, more effective and 
beneficial impact on global wealth and development than foreign aid on an annual basis. 
 Establishing freer international labor mobility could also go a long way toward 
reversing the trend of rising global income inequality. Although poverty has been in 
decline in recent decades, income inequality has increased within and between rich and 
poor countries since the 1970s and 1980s.
23
 Compared to the nineteenth century, when 
                                                          
 
20
 Andrei Shleifer, “Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid,” Cato Journal 29.3 (2009): 381-2. 
21
 Mark Anderson, “Foreign Aid Close to Record Peak after Donors Spend $135 billion in 2014,” The 
Guardian, April 8, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/08/foreign-aid-
spending-2014-least-developed-countries>. 
22
 Sharun Mukand, “International Migration, Politics and Culture: The Case for Greater Labor Mobility,” 
The CAGE-Chatham House Series 2 (2012): 1.  
23
 Brian Keeley, “What’s Happening to Income Inequality?,” Income Inequality: The Gap Between Rich 
and Poor, OECD Publishing (2015): 32. 
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rich countries’ incomes were only about ten times greater than those of the poorest, 
today’s ratio of income inequality is fifty to one.24  
Also, an estimated two-thirds of an individual’s income inequality originates 
from their country of birth, as opposed to their educational attainment, skills, or 
experience.
25
 The truth is that someone from a poor country working in a rich country, 
all else held equal, increases their earnings by three to five times on average.
26
 This 
difference unsurprisingly encourages the citizens of the developing world to pursue 
labor migration, and providing legal avenues for that migration could help these 
individuals around the world take advantage of the severe wage disparities while 
maintaining their dignity and protecting their rights. Moreover, this could decrease 
global income inequality by facilitating the exchange of more money from the rich to 
the poor, in addition to human capital attainment, in return for honest work and to the 
benefit of all. 
Monetary Benefits to the Developing World 
 One of the most significant impacts of greater international labor mobility is the 
corresponding increase in remittances sent from developed countries to developing 
countries. In 2015, the World Bank estimates that migrants sent $601 billion home to 
their families in the form of remittances, and of that total, developing countries received 
                                                          
 
24
 Winnie Byanyima, “Richest 1% Will Own More than All the Rest by 2016,” Oxfam International, 
January 19, 2015, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2015-01-19/richest-1-will-own-
more-all-rest-2016>.  
25
 Branko Milanovic, “Global Inequality of Opportunity: How Much of Our Income is Determined by 
Where We Live?,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 97.2  (2015): 1.  
26
 Ibid. 
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$441 billion, which is almost three times the amount of official international 
development assistance.
27
 The U.S. was the largest remittance source country, and India 
and China were the largest remittance receiving countries.
28
 While remittances 
accounted for only 0.7 percent of world GDP in 2007, they were 2.1 percent of the GDP 
of developing countries, and 5.8 percent of the GDP of least-developed countries.
29
 In 
an OECD study, Dayton-Johnson et al. found that a 10 percent increase in the share of 
remittances in GDP is associated with 1.2 percent reduction in poverty.
30
 Clearly, 
remittances are already very important to developing countries, and greater labor 
migration can serve to deepen and expand their positive impact.  
Perhaps the greatest inherent strength of remittances is that unlike other sources 
of funding such as international aid and trade, remittances go straight into the pockets of 
migrants’ families and their communities. Families intrinsically know far better than 
their government what they need most and how to spend their money effectively. For 
instance, remittances can increase investment in education for children and decrease 
child labor, as well as make health care more affordable.
31
 Girls’ school attendance can 
also rise, and more secondary school graduates can find themselves much better able to 
afford a tertiary education.
32
 Overall, remittances can stimulate consumption and 
                                                          
 
27
 “Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd ed,” World Bank Group (2016): v. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Sherry Stephenson and Gary Hufbauer, “Chapter 13: Labor Mobility,” Preferential Trade Agreement 
Policies for Development: A Handbook, Washington, World Bank (2011): 280. 
30
 Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Antje Pfeiffer, Kirsten Schuettler, and Johanna Schwinnn, “Migration and 
Employment,” Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Employment, OECD (2009): 151. 
31
 “The Contribution of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth,” ILO, OECD, and World Bank Group, 
Joint Paper for G20 Labor and Employment Ministers’ Meeting (2015): 10. 
32
 Ibid. 
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investment, which boosts local economies, increases financial savings and spurs 
improvements to community financial institutions.
33
 
Over half of the world’s migrants reside in G20 countries.34 Out of total global 
remittance flows, their remittances to and from these countries is almost 80%, as 
estimated in 2014.
35
 Remittances are currently the second-most important source of 
capital to the developing world, and they can greatly increase with the help of the 
liberalization of international labor mobility restrictions. The 2015 remittance total of 
$441 billion received by the developing world could be $300 billion greater if the 
developed world allocated an additional 3% of its jobs to approximately 16 million 
people from the developing world.
36
 Migrants already hold 7% of the developed 
world’s jobs, so increasing that on a highly conditional temporary migrant worker basis 
should be both feasible and worthwhile from an economic standpoint. Also, it is 
important to keep in mind that no country has a fixed number of jobs, and migrants act 
as much as job creators as workers by increasing daily economic activity and consumer 
demand in their communities. Increasing remittances via promoting increased labor 
migration could go a long way toward reducing poverty, increasing human capital 
attainment, and improving the health and wellbeing of the people of the developing 
world. 
                                                          
 
33
 Karine Manyonga Kamuleta, “The Impacts of Remittances on Developing Countries,” Directorate-
General for External Policies: Policy Department (2014): 22. 
34
 The G20, or Group of Twenty, is an international forum for the governments and central bank 
governors of the world’s 20 largest economies. Over half of the world’s migrants reside and work in these 
countries, which include Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, India, China, 
the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany. 
35
 Kamuleta, 1. 
36
 “Increase in the Labor Force Can be an Engine for Development,” Worldwatch Institute, 
<http://www.worldwatch.org/increase-labor-force-can-be-engine-development-0>. 
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Monetary Benefits to the Developed World 
  The benefits of increased temporary international labor migration do not go 
exclusively to migrants and their home countries. In reality, everyone involved has 
much to gain. That includes the developed countries that receive temporary labor 
migrants.  
 It is well worth noting that in the past decade immigrants have represented 
almost half of the increase in the U.S.’s and Canada’s workforce, and 70 percent in 
Europe’s.37 While many of these workers can be associated with the brain drain effect 
of highly-skilled professionals migrating from developing countries and contributing to 
the disproportionately large stock of human capital in the developed world, most are 
unskilled laborers willing to take jobs deemed too unattractive by the majority of 
developed countries’ domestic workers. Importantly, many more unskilled workers 
would move in pursuit of these jobs if opportunities for legal migration were extended. 
Migration expands the developed world’s workforce by providing an influx of young 
workers who contribute to GDP growth and economic expansion.
38
 Young, 
economically active migrants can beneficially alter an otherwise aging country’s 
demographics, namely by reducing dependency ratios.
39
 These are major benefits of 
which the developed world is currently only enjoying the tip of the iceberg. 
 One of the clearest benefits of labor migrants is that they satisfy industrialized 
countries’ demands for cheap, low-skilled labor. The industries with the highest demand 
                                                          
 
37
 “The Contribution of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth,” 11. 
38
 Ibid., 12. 
39
 Ibid. 
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for this labor include agriculture, food-processing, construction, and low- or unskilled 
manufacturing such as textiles, as well as low-wage services like domestic work and 
home health care.
40
 Sometimes these jobs, particularly in manufacturing, are known as 
the “3-D” jobs: dirty, degrading and dangerous.41 The labor demands of these 
businesses are typically unsatisfied by nationals due to low pay, dangerous conditions, 
and social stigmatization. Consequently, demand for cheap, unskilled migrant labor is 
persistent, and foreign workers perform vital roles in industrialized economies. 
Furthermore, recipient countries can benefit from migrant labor by importing the labor 
they require to resolve internal labor resource mismatches and bottlenecks.
42
 This can 
increase both micro- and macroeconomic levels of production and efficiency in 
receiving countries, and could yield enhanced economic development on a regional 
scale.
43
 
For instance, one specific benefit of international migrant labor programs is an 
improved regional elasticity of labor, particularly for unskilled workers. The offer of 
available labor opportunities elsewhere can relieve the pressure for outward migration 
from economically stagnant areas, allowing labor to flow naturally to where demand is 
most concentrated. As the situation currently stands, harsh immigration restrictions 
impede millions of people from bettering their lives by denying people the opportunity 
to engage in business with their best customers.
44
 Namely, workers are barred from 
                                                          
 
40
 Taran and Geronimi, 6. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Kubursi, “The Economics of Migration,” 19. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Caplan, 19. 
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offering their labor to the highest bidding employers because they are denied access to 
the developed world’s labor market. 
 Another way labor migrants can give back to the developed world is through 
increased tax revenues. It is a common misconception that migrants abuse their host 
countries’ welfare systems by using much more in welfare than the average American 
family. This misconception is fueled by reports like the one released in 2015 by the 
Center for Immigration Studies, an organization that advocates for more restrictive 
immigration policies in the U.S. The report found that 51 percent of immigrant 
households, whether legal or unauthorized, receive some form of welfare and thereby 
pose a fiscal burden on the U.S.
45
 However, this report is exaggerated and 
misrepresentative. Since the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the only immigrants who can qualify for 
welfare are green card holders and refugees with asylum; all other immigrants, both 
legal and undocumented, are ineligible for welfare.
46
  
In addition, The American Immigration Council found that immigrants are net 
contributors to the welfare system. A 2010 report by the Council discovered that 
“immigrants earn about $240 billion a year, pay about $90 billion a year in taxes, and 
use about $5 billion in public benefits…[and] immigrant tax payments total $20 to $30 
                                                          
 
45
 Steven A. Camarota, “Welfare Use by Immigrant and Native Households: An Analysis of Medicaid, 
Cash, Food, and Housing Programs,” Center for Immigration Studies (2015): 2. 
46
 Robin K. Cohen, “PRWORA’s Immigrant Provisions,” December 13, 2007, OLR Research Report, 
<https://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0705.htm>. 
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billion more than the amount of government services they use.”47 Further evidence that 
immigrants support rather than abuse the U.S. welfare system comes from a 2013 report 
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which concluded that “more than half of 
undocumented immigrants have federal and state income, Social Security, and Medicare 
taxes automatically deducted from their paychecks.”48 Even though they are ineligible 
for benefits, immigrants pay taxes that fund them; the apparent injustice in this is a real 
concern, but it would be difficult to reconcile in the current political climate that deems 
migrants as ‘takers’ rather than ‘producers’. The net fiscal benefit of immigrants would 
hold true under a temporary migrant labor program as well, because temporary migrants 
would not be eligible for welfare, and they also would not be allowed to bring their 
families and children, so additional education and health care costs would not be an 
issue. 
Another point to consider is that welfare states focus on the old, rather than the 
poor, as evidenced in the U.S. by the sheer size and funding of Social Security and 
Medicare compared to means-tested programs for the poor like SNAP and Medicaid.
49
 
More specifically, in 2015, $888 billion went toward Social Security and $546 billion 
went to Medicare, while Medicaid and other health insurance programs including the 
Affordable Care Act received $392 billion and safety net programs like SNAP and 
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school meals were allocated $362 billion.
50
 Since temporary migrants will return to 
their home countries before they reach retirement and old age, the taxes they pay while 
working in the developed world are pure profits to the host countries.
51
 An OECD study 
from 2013 found that immigrants pose neither a fiscal burden nor offer a perfect 
solution for addressing a country’s fiscal problems.52 If welfare costs are a concern for a 
host country, the simple solution is to deny or reduce temporary migrants’ access to 
welfare to whatever degree or for whatever time period is deemed prudent.  
Such a move is not unheard of. In fact, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron 
sought such a provision when negotiating the U.K.’s special status in the E.U. in early 
2016. Specifically, he noted that one of the chief aims of the negotiations “was to 
reduce the very high level of migration from within the E.U. by…preventing [the] 
welfare system acting as a magnet for people to come” to the U.K.53 What this means in 
practice is that migrants to the U.K. must now wait four years before they have full 
access to benefits in the country, they cannot apply for certain unemployment benefits, 
and they  now receive child benefit stipends for their children back home based on the 
PPP of their own country rather than standard UK rates.
54
 It is worth pointing out that 
                                                          
 
50
 “Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?”, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
March 4, 2016, <http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/policy-basics-where-do-our-federal-tax-
dollars-go>. 
51
 Bryan Caplan, “Why Should We Restrict Immigration,” Cato Journal 32.1 (2012): 10.  
52
 OECD: “The fiscal impact of immigration in OECD countries” in International migration outlook 2013 
(Paris, OECD Publishing, 2013); OECD: “Is migration good for the economy?” (Paris, OECD Publishing, 
2014b). 
53
 David  Cameron, “PM Statement Following European Council Meeting,” Prime Minister’s Office, 10 
Downing Street, February 19, 2016.  
54
 Ibid. 
 
 
20 
 
evidence suggests that benefits are not a significant pull factor for E.U. migrant workers, 
as well as the reality that these workers are net contributors to the U.K. economy.
55
  
Until an international legally-binding agreement is established by the United 
Nations or another major international organization laying out the universal rights of 
migrant workers, each recipient state can negotiate the benefits that migrants are 
entitled to with sending states. Hence, migrants’ access to social services will differ 
state by state, but if they have greater mobility they will be able to choose which state 
offers them the best deal, and in turn states may compete for more migrants by offering 
more entitlements than other recipient states, potentially creating a virtuous cycle. 
Additionally, even though more migrants would mean a larger population for a 
host country to take care of, this population boost would not present any particularly 
burdensome extra costs. This is because the expensive political and social institutions 
necessary for protecting and organizing the state’s population are already well-
established, and large costs such as defense spending would not need to increase in 
order for the country to protect a larger population.
56
 Any growth in state costs would 
be overshadowed by enormous gains in increased tax revenues, greater efficiency in the 
labor market, and higher levels of economic production and efficiency. 
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Social Benefits of Greater International Labor Mobility 
In addition to its economic benefits, increased international labor mobility also 
offers many social benefits, particularly with regard to human rights, ethics, and global 
justice. Existing immigration policies raise many moral questions and concerns, and 
increased labor mobility presents an opportunity to answer and resolve them, and 
improve upon the current situation.  
First off, what does the current situation look like? In the U.S., for example, the 
evolution of tight contemporary immigration controls, including the barriers and 
difficulties associated with obtaining a work visa as well as fortified borders with tall 
fences and patrol agents, have resulted in a higher death rate of illegal migrants on the 
border. It is estimated that at least one migrant dies each day trying to cross the U.S.-
Mexico border, usually due to exposure to the elements.
57
 Despite the dangers, migrants 
continue to attempt border crossings, proving that immigration controls are ultimately 
ineffective because “migratory movements, once started, become self-sustaining social 
processes.”58 Furthermore, between 2000 and 2010, the U.S. government deported 
nearly three million people and intimidated an additional 11 million into “voluntarily” 
leaving.
59
 At least 10 million migrants currently living in the U.S. endure the day-to-day 
humiliation and fear of “being illegal.”60 The overexploitation and social vulnerability 
that they and many undocumented migrants around the world endure is unnecessary and 
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unjust. These migrants would greatly benefit from wider legal avenues for temporary 
labor migration. 
One key benefit of liberal labor migration policies is their capacity to combat 
discrimination. Discrimination based on nationality is the most widespread and 
pervasive form of discrimination still deemed universally acceptable. An individual’s 
country of birth is the largest determinant of their well-being in life, yet they very often 
face insurmountable barriers if they decide to change their nationality in pursuit of a 
better life. Branko Milanovic, a lead economist for the World Bank, found that “more 
than two-thirds of global income inequality is due to national income differences” 
among countries.
61
 There is so much income to be gained by migration. More 
specifically, a study conducted by Michael Clemens, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant 
Pritchett found that, roughly estimated, “existing border distortions produce an available 
welfare gain to a marginal moderate-skill mover from a typical developing country of 
around $10,000 a year,” which is “double the average GDP per capita of all developing 
economies in aggregate ($4,911 in 2007).”62 Consequently, not only does increased 
international labor mobility confront the global acceptance of discrimination based on 
nationality, but it also offers the opportunity for individuals to take advantage of wide 
wage differentials between countries as documented residents with legal protections. 
Under more liberal labor migration policies, “the logic of personhood supersedes the 
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logic of national citizenship,” and “a more universal model of membership anchored in 
transcendent and de-territorialized notions of personal rights” can be realized.63 
International agreements increasing labor mobility between the developed and 
developing worlds will ensure greater protection of the fundamental human rights of 
migrants, helping maintain their human dignity and combat overexploitation in the 
workplace by extending them legal status, basic rights, and freedom from the constant 
fear of deportation. The ethical principle that every person’s fundamental rights should 
be assured is the foundation of the United Nations International Convention on 
Migrants’ Rights, and bilateral labor migration agreements can defend this principle 
much better than walls and deportations.
64
 Illegal migrants need an avenue by which 
they can gain legal status, particularly in the form of work visas, and greater labor 
mobility can offer this not just to current illegal migrants but also many more would-be 
migrants hoping for the opportunity to work in the developed world.  
The Growing Threat of Climate Change 
 In order to discuss climate change in the same context as international labor 
mobility, it is useful to point out the legal differences between a migrant and an 
environmental refugee. Environmental refugees are still not recognized under 
international law in the same way as refugees fleeing from war or persecution. 
Meanwhile, economic migrants enjoy the right to apply for work visas, and war 
refugees can qualify for asylum under the Geneva Convention. However, climate 
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refugees do not fit within existing migration rules, leaving them in a legal limbo. Their 
legal status and rights need to be formally established in the near future, ideally by the 
UN. In the meantime, the assumption that all environmental refugees are potential 
economic migrants is useful. Basically, this means that anyone whose livelihood is 
negatively impacted by the effects of climate change may choose to migrate in search of 
economic opportunities in order to earn enough money to be able to either adapt or 
move permanently to a less vulnerable location. 
 The UN has predicted that there will be up to 200 million environmental 
refugees by 2050, while other estimates have suggested as many as a billion refugees by 
mid-century.
65
 These figures account for both internal displacement within countries as 
well as international migration. For comparison, in 2008 there were “only” 20 million 
environmental refugees.
66
 As numbers of these refugees rise, many of them are very 
likely to become economic migrants, leaving their countries in search of jobs and higher 
wages. Therefore, over time, there will be more economic migrants who move to 
wealthier states to earn money in order to help their families adapt and repair their 
homes and livelihoods, or afford the costs of moving. These economic migrants see 
greater opportunities elsewhere and aspire to take advantage of them. 
 Environmental refugees, pushed by climate change’s long-term, growing 
consequences, can and already are becoming economic migrants. They are thusly 
emphasizing the pressing need for greater international labor mobility. Back home they 
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face a host of climate-induced challenges. These include saltwater intrusion, which 
results in a reduction of freshwater resources and devastates croplands, and it is a huge 
concern for small island states and low-lying, coastal populations. More devastating still, 
sea level rise threatens to permanently displace millions upon millions of people. For 
example, the majority of Bangladesh lies less than 20 feet above sea level, and more 
than a quarter of the country is expected to be inundated by 2100, displacing up to 15 
million people.
67
 In the meanwhile, the annual flow of Bangladeshis overseas in search 
of employment has increased fourfold from around 248,000 in 1999-2000 to more than 
980,000 in 2007-2008, mainly driven by the Gulf states’ increasing demand for cheap 
labor.
68
 Regarding other climate change impacts, climatologists anticipate stronger, 
more frequent storm surges, cyclones, and typhoons, which can be utterly devastating, 
particularly to the world’s highly vulnerable poor. Weather patterns are also expected to 
shift, leading to droughts and floods in places incapable of handling such drastic and 
destructive changes.
69
 These are just a few of the anticipated major impacts of climate 
change, but many populations are already actively seeking solutions and resources. 
 The worst-affected populations whose homes will be - and in some places 
already are - inundated with seawater or made barren by drought will have no choice 
but to move internally, likely to increasingly congested urban areas, or migrate 
internationally. These people, who are in desperate need of new permanent homes, are 
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arguably the moral responsibility of the developed world given its complicity in 
creating the destructive climate change that ruined these people’s livelihoods. Beyond 
assisting and possibly welcoming these seriously-affected individuals and communities, 
the developed world can lend a hand towards helping everyone adversely impacted by 
climate change to rebuild their lives back home by letting them migrate for work and 
earn the higher wages of the developed world. Remittances can be prudently invested in 
useful adaptation technologies and more resilient infrastructure, and possibly internal 
relocation or community projects. Even though the opening of doors is unlikely to 
directly help the most vulnerable, poorest, and least-educated of the developing world 
gain access to higher wage jobs in the developed world, it is very likely to indirectly 
assist them through the remittances earned by their relatively better off compatriots and 
the ensuing community-level improvements.  
International labor mobility should be seriously considered as part of the answer 
in addressing the future increase in labor migration that will be spurred by climate 
change. However, to reiterate, the international community has a responsibility to do 
even more than this to assist climate change-affected individuals and communities 
around the globe, including, for instance, by welcoming them as refugees, providing 
technical adaptation assistance, and helping them develop resilience to the negative 
impacts of climate change. 
Potential Drawbacks 
 It is important to address the possible drawbacks of increased international labor 
mobility and counter the biggest arguments against it. These arguments include 
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suppression of citizens’ wages, the welfare problem, and terrorism, but of course there 
are many other concerns.
70
   
To begin, one key argument against more liberal labor migration policies is that 
the influx of unskilled labor will lower wages and worsen the income distribution 
within receiving countries. While this is a possibility, the impact can be mitigated. 
Without immigration restrictions, the developed world’s supply of labor would 
dramatically increase. Under a semi-open borders scenario such as this, low-skilled 
wages would likely decrease in receiving countries, but it is therefore very important to 
keep in mind that most citizens of developed countries are not low-skilled.
72
 Also, 
immigration has little to no effect on overall wages, particularly in the long run.
73
 In 
fact, moderately-educated American citizens enjoyed long run gains.
74
 Note that when 
immigration increases, physical skills such as manual labor become much more 
plentiful while language skills, specifically fluency in the primary language of the 
receiving country, become scarcer. Since most jobs are a mix of these two types of 
skills, immigration could actually increase the wages of the receiving country’s citizens. 
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This is because an influx of immigrants could induce lower-skilled American-born 
workers to switch over to more language-based jobs, helping them earn higher pay for 
their language skills than they earned for their physical skills.
75
 In fact, this effect has 
been determined to cut the estimated negative impact of immigration on low-skilled 
citizens’ wages by an impressive 75 percent.76 Consequently, this drawback is not 
anywhere near as problematic as it first appears. If the well-being of lower-skilled 
citizens remains a concern, labor migrants can be charged surtaxes and/or 
administration fees, of which the excess revenue can be harnessed to compensate low-
skilled citizens via providing them with access to funding for higher education or job 
training.
77
 
 Another potential drawback that was briefly touched upon earlier is the concern 
that migrants may pose a fiscal burden to receiving countries because they use more in 
services than they pay in taxes. However, this is not actually a viable concern in the 
context of a temporary labor migration program. As noted, welfare states focus on the 
old much more than the poor. Since temporary labor migrants are young, solitary 
workers, they would end up supporting elderly citizens rather than “milking the 
system”.78 Indeed, even if immigrants’ tax bills are far below average, they still do not 
pose a fiscal burden. If policymakers remain concerned that immigrants may pose a 
fiscal burden on American taxpayers despite evidence to the contrary, then they can 
make migrant laborers permanently ineligible for benefits or reduce or limit the benefits 
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they are eligible for.
79
 They can also make employers pay costs associated with health 
care and workers’ benefits. Thusly, the fiscal concerns associated with increase labor 
mobility can be readily mitigated. 
 Another possible drawback of greater international labor mobility between 
developed and developing countries is increased exposure to terrorism. The concern is 
that more freedom of movement between countries will give terrorists much easier 
access to targets in the West. This issue has taken center stage recently following the 
November 13, 2015 terror attacks in Paris that left 130 dead and 352 wounded.
80
 In 
Europe, some people worry that once a terrorist enters the European Union s/he can 
travel throughout the “borderless”, 26-nation Schengen area (including almost all of 
Western Europe) unchecked. In response to the Paris attacks, the E.U. tightened border 
checks at the external borders of the Schengen area, including establishing systematic 
ID checks.
81
 It remains possible, perhaps even probable, that passport checks and 
checkpoints may reappear at borders within the Schengen area, and the borderless 
experiment will cease to exist. The region is pressured not only by the threat of 
terrorism, but also the ongoing refugee crisis and an excruciatingly slow economic 
recovery following the Great Recession. 
 However, even the strictest border checks in the world could not guarantee 
safety from terrorist threats in Europe, the U.S., or anywhere else. This is because the 
                                                          
 
7979
 Ibid., 11. 
80
 “Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night,” December 9, 2015, BBC News, < 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994>.  
81
 Ian Traynor, “E.U. Travellers to Face Stricter Checks under French Border Plan,” November 18, 2015, 
The Guardian, < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/eu-travellers-tighter-id-checks-french-
clampdown-borders-paris-attacks>.  
 
 
30 
 
ideas that are responsible for terrorist attacks cannot be checked at the borders between 
countries; they can spread throughout the globe and radicalize the minds of any 
country’s citizens. As one of innumerable examples, one of the shooters in the 
December 2, 2015 San Bernardino, California terrorist attack which killed 14 and 
wounded 17 others was an American-born U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent.
82
 Even 
more telling, according to a report by New America, a Washington research center, 
since the attacks of September 11, right-wing extremists, such as white supremacists, 
have killed almost twice as many people as radical Muslims in the U.S.
83
 Consequently, 
“homegrown” radicals now pose a larger threat than jihadists in the U.S., yet there is no 
federal agency that works specifically on domestic terrorist threats – arguably an 
oversight worth remedying.
84
 Therefore, while not ignoring the fact that border security 
is important, it is essential that the developed world does not let its legitimate concerns 
about terrorism deter it from promoting and upholding liberal immigration policies, and 
in particular increased temporary labor migration.
85
 Incidentally, such policies may 
ultimately help to deter terrorism by offering economic opportunities to people in dire 
need of them. 
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Conclusion 
 Increased international labor mobility, particularly in the form of temporary 
labor migration, promises extraordinary, untapped benefits to all countries willing to 
open their borders to labor, just as they have already done for trade and capital. 
Developing countries can earn more remittances, developed countries can satisfy their 
demands for cheap, unskilled labor, and the world as a whole can become more 
prosperous and integrated. Creating and widening existing avenues for international 
labor migration alongside the provision of aid and assistance to refugees can help the 
developing world adapt to climate change.  
This effort will not be without its challenges. In the U.S., there has not been any 
major immigration reform since the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 
Recent efforts for reform have been held up by a polarized Congress. The legislation 
they have considered but failed to pass in recent years includes more barriers to 
immigration, not fewer. Frustrated with Congress’s lack of progress and aiming to 
fulfill reelection promises, President Barack Obama issued a series of executive orders 
in 2014 that would offer temporary legal status and an indefinite deferment of 
deportation to millions of undocumented immigrants. His plan includes the creation of a 
program called Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) and an expansion of 
another program he created in 2012 called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA).
86
 Congressional Republicans were infuriated by the President’s unilateral 
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actions, considering it an overreach of his authority, and 26 states sued the U.S. in order 
to stop the orders from going into effect.
87
 So far, the courts have ruled against the 
President’s actions, and in the summer of 2016 the Supreme Court will make the final 
decision on the matter. Even if the Supreme Court justices vote in favor of the 
President’s actions, there is still need for more extensive reforms that can only be 
realized through Congress. Unfortunately, given the current political climate, with the 
most polarized Congress in history, it is highly unlikely that the federal government will 
make any progress on immigration reform anytime soon.  
It is far too optimistic to begin the push for greater international labor mobility 
with expectations for a sudden international transformation, but instead by supporting 
the gradual development of labor mobility agreements between countries, we can 
incrementally increase international labor migration around the globe, knocking down 
stubborn barriers and common misconceptions in its path. In this way, the economic 
and social wealth that labor migration promises to deliver can be realized. 
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Chapter III: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Greater 
International Labor Mobility to the U.S. and Mexico 
The purpose of this chapter is to narrow the analysis of the economic benefits 
and drawbacks of increased international labor mobility to the United States and its 
regional neighbors, in particular Mexico. The impetus behind this focus on the U.S. and 
Mexico stems from the two countries’ long, rich history of labor migration, current 
immigration restrictions and stigmatization of illegal migrants, and the mutual 
profitability they could realize by establishing meaningful legislation. The U.S.’s 
position as a global leader means it could promote greater international labor mobility 
around the world and establish multilateral, and potentially global, migrant labor 
programs between developed and developing countries. This chapter will make the 
argument in favor of a temporary labor migration program between the U.S. and 
Mexico by explaining and analyzing modern labor ties between the two countries, the 
rise in illegal immigration, the Bracero program, the evolution of the U.S.’s 
immigration laws, and the benefits of a new migrant labor program. 
Labor Migration between Mexico and the U.S. 
Of the 42.4 million immigrants living in the U.S. in 2014, about 11.7 million, or 
28 percent, were Mexican.
88
 An additional 130,000 Mexican immigrants moved to the 
U.S. in that year.
89
 Mexican immigrants are by far the largest immigrant group in the 
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U.S., followed by immigrant groups from India, China, and the Philippines.
90
 In fact, 
the largest immigrant populations in the majority of the states of the U.S. are Mexican, 
which is quite different from the mainly European immigrant populations of the early 
twentieth century (see Appendix A). 
So, if Mexicans are already able to immigrate to the U.S. in such large numbers 
so successfully, why is it important to establish a migrant labor program? The truth is 
that, thanks to border controls and immigration restrictions, it is now extremely costly 
and dangerous for the average Mexican worker to attempt to enter the U.S., likely more 
so now than ever before. Due to the serious difficulties of obtaining work visas, many 
immigrants are undocumented. Also, thanks to the militarization of the borders, 
unauthorized migrants who make it into the U.S. are less likely to return home as often 
as they used to.  
Unauthorized immigration from Mexico is no small issue. As of 2014, there are 
about 5.6 million unauthorized Mexican immigrants living in the U.S., which is actually 
a million fewer than in 2007 (see Appendix B).
91
 Although the number of unauthorized 
immigrants in the U.S. has stabilized since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and 
Great Recession, it had been rapidly increasing since 1990.
92
 In 1990, there were 
approximately 3.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. As of 2014, this number 
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has leveled off around 11.3 million, with no less than half of these immigrants coming 
from Mexico.
93
 Annual immigration flows from Mexico peaked in the late 1990s and 
having been falling since (see Appendix D). The fall and subsequent stabilization in 
immigration flows following 2007 was caused by a combination of factors, especially 
the sharp economic downturn in the U.S., increased border enforcement, higher cost of 
crossing over, and economic and population changes in Mexico.
94
 
Who are Mexican Immigrants and Why Do They Come? 
Migrating from Mexico to the U.S. is a fairly popular idea among Mexicans, 
particularly those in economically dire situations. Although a third of Mexican adults 
believe that life in the U.S. is neither better nor worse than life in Mexico, around half 
of them believe that life in the U.S. is better than it is in Mexico.
95
 Also, about 35% say 
they would be willing to move to the U.S. if given the opportunity.
96
 In recent decades, 
migration from Mexico has diversified geographically. Historically, Mexicans 
immigrants came from the states that comprise Mexico’s heartland. Now, immigrants 
also come from Mexico’s gulf coast, its southern and southeastern states, and other 
areas.
97
 More indigenous people from Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and other states in 
Mexico have joined the migratory flows to the U.S.  
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Mexican immigrants are drawn to the U.S. by a combination of economic 
factors. The biggest pull is jobs and higher wages in the U.S. The U.S.’s economic 
expansion in the 1990s spurred unprecedented increases in immigration flows from 
Mexico, attracted by job opportunities in agricultural, construction, and service 
industries.
98
 These immigrants were also pushed by the economic crises in Mexico in 
the 1980s and 1995.
99
 During the 1995 crisis, for instance, 35% of Mexicans were in 
extreme poverty, defined as living on less than $1.25 per day.
100
 Although that trend has 
reversed since the Great Recession, Mexican immigrants still point to jobs and salary as 
their main reasons for migrating to the U.S.
101
  
The economic impetus to migrate to the U.S. is made readily apparent by the 
difference in GDP per capita between the two countries. Mexico’s GDP per capita as of 
2015 is about $10,325, while the U.S.’s is approximately $54,629.102 This magnitude of 
difference is even more pronounced for Mexico’s poor. The average salary of Mexicans 
living in rural parts of Mexico is about three to four times less than those living in urban 
areas, so they have even more to gain from migrating.
103
 Although a Mexican 
immigrant’s wages are typically $10 per hour or less, and sometimes seem exploitative 
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from a U.S. perspective, on average they still earn more than they would in Mexico.
104
 
Even an undocumented immigrant earns 1.8 times more by working in the U.S. than 
they would earn in Mexico.
105
 Until wage differentials between the neighboring 
countries converge, many poor, unskilled Mexicans will continue to be pushed from 
their homes and drawn to the economic opportunities offered within the U.S. 
Mexican immigrants used to travel back and forth between the U.S. and their 
hometowns in Mexico pretty frequently. However, this began changing in 1996, when 
the U.S. started to construct a wall along the border between Mexico and California.
106
 
The wall redirected undocumented migrants to routes through more isolated areas, such 
as the Arizona desert, which drastically heightened the dangers and costs of making the 
trip. For example, it takes about five days to cross the border through the Arizona desert, 
and it is impossible for an individual to carry enough water for that long of a journey, 
which means a lot of people die of dehydration, heat stroke, or exposure. Despite the 
serious dangers of border crossing, most migrants have no intention of staying in the 
U.S. permanently. In fact, a study conducted by a bi-national non-profit called 
Mexicans and Americans Thinking Together (MATT) found that only 16 percent of 
Mexican immigrants expressed this intention.
107
 Migrants would go home more 
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regularly if the border was not so thoroughly blockaded, but border enforcement does 
not deter them from returning home entirely. 
In more recent years, Mexican immigrants have been returning home in 
significant numbers, adding up to one million between 2009 and 2014.
108
 The Great 
Recession and a slow economic recovery in the U.S. offer a good explanation for this. 
However, the MATT study found that more Mexican migrants cited family and 
nostalgia as their chief reason for returning home, over unemployment, health problems, 
or other issues.
109
 The militarization of the border perpetuates extended periods of 
familial separation and likely plays a large role in migrants’ reasoning. 
Where do Mexican Immigrants Work? 
Most Mexican immigrants settle in California (37 percent), Texas (21 percent), 
and Illinois (6 percent).
110
 From 2010 to 2014, the four U.S. cities with the largest 
number of Mexican immigrants were Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Dallas, 
which combined were home to 31 percent of all Mexican immigrants in the U.S.
111
 On 
the whole, most Mexican immigrants live in the Southwest, although high 
concentrations are scattered throughout the country, particularly in the Pacific 
Northwest, where labor-intensive agriculture is prominent (see Appendix E).  
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U.S. industries with high shares of unauthorized immigrants include agriculture 
(25 percent), building, grounds-keeping and maintenance (19 percent), construction (17 
percent), and food preparation and serving (12 percent), based on a Pew Hispanic 
Center survey in 2008.
112
 The U.S. agricultural industry is particularly dependent on 
foreign labor. According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s National Agricultural 
Workers Survey in 2014, “approximately 71% of farmworkers are immigrants…95% 
[of whom] were from Mexico,” and somewhere between 48 to 70 percent are 
unauthorized.
113
 However, contrary to popular perceptions, over 70 percent of 
unauthorized immigrants work outside of the agricultural sector; only around 26 percent 
of them work within that sector, as of 2012.
114
 Most undocumented Mexican 
immigrants work in “non-private household service occupations, precision production 
craft occupations or as operators, fabricators, and laborers,” with about 23 percent in the 
manufacturing of both durable and nondurable goods, 18 percent in construction, and 16 
percent in retail.
115
 About a fifth of Mexican unauthorized immigrants worked in 
construction in 2012, while over a tenth worked in services ranging from legal services 
to landscaping.
116
 Even though unauthorized immigrants make up only about 4 percent 
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of the U.S. population, they comprise 5.4 percent of its labor force.
117
 As a consequence, 
they are vital to the day-to-day functioning and prosperity of the American economy.  
Among Mexican immigrants in general, about 87% of Mexican immigrants are 
of working age (18 to 64).
118
 Also, 69 percent participate in the civilian labor force, 
predominantly in service occupations (31 percent), natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance operations (26 percent), and production, transportation, and material-
moving occupations (22 percent) (see Appendix C).
119
 Immigrants work 
disproportionately in the more dangerous, high-risk industries in the U.S. compared to 
American-born citizens, particularly in mining, logging, construction, motor vehicle 
operation, waste management, and agriculture.
120
 Immigrant workers account for almost 
a fifth of on-the-job fatalities, and shockingly those are not caused only by occupational 
hazards, but by homicide.
121
 According to a study by Orrenius and Zavodny (2009), 
more than 3,000 immigrant workers were murdered while at their jobs between 1992 
and 2005, which made homicide the number one cause of workplace fatalities among 
immigrant laborers.
122
 In the population as a whole, workplace homicides target women, 
particularly supervisors of sales workers, retail sales workers, and motor vehicle 
operators, and most are attributed to a stranger rather than a coworker, customer, or 
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relative.
123
 Also, disturbingly, suicide among Latino immigrant workers increased more 
than 200 percent in 2013 compared to 2012.
124
 
Both undocumented and documented Mexican migrants alike work largely in 
the service sector. In light of that, it is worth noting that the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics estimates that employment in the service sector will increase over 12 percent 
between 2008 and 2018, increasing employment to 131.1 million people compared to 
112.8 million in 2011.
125
 The service sector includes wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation, and other services that Mexican migrants already provide, and the 
growth in this sector is bound to increase the demand for their labor. 
What are the Costs and Benefits of Unskilled Immigration to the U.S.? 
 One of the greatest benefits that immigrants provide their host countries is 
greater economic efficiency. They do so by “reducing bottlenecks caused by labor 
shortages, both in the high- and low-skill areas, and creating jobs for native-born 
Americans.”126 This positive effect would be amplified if undocumented migrants 
gained temporary legal status, since it would be easier for migrants “to move to sectors 
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where their skills and education are both valued and relevant to the work being 
conducted.”127  
Immigrants do not compete for the same jobs as average Americans. Although 
immigrants in the U.S. comprise less than a fifth of the labor force, they represent 
almost half of the labor force without a high school diploma.
128
 Meanwhile, over 90 
percent of American-born citizens have completed secondary education or higher; 
consequently, immigrants do not compete directly with most American-born workers 
since the two groups have different levels of human capital attainment.
129
 
Correspondingly, it may be said that “immigrants complement rather than substitute for 
native-born workers.”130  
 This positive characteristic of complementariness especially holds true for 
Hispanic and Latino immigrants, who make up 42 percent of the U.S.’s unskilled (i.e. 
no high school diploma) labor force.
131
 These immigrants choose jobs that American 
citizens generally avoid, like fruit picking, housekeeping, and janitorial or maintenance 
work. By doing these jobs, low-skilled immigrants help higher-skilled, American-born 
workers spend less time doing household chores, allowing them to spend more time at 
work. This effectively raises the country’s supply of high-skilled labor.132  
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 Another benefit of low-skilled immigration is increased labor force mobility. 
Low-skilled citizens are typically immobile across regions, which slows growth in 
economically booming regions and recovery in depressed ones.
133
 In contrast, low-
skilled immigrants are much more geographically mobile, and by being so willing to 
move to wherever the demand is high, they “smooth fluctuations in the U.S. economy 
and ease the burden on U.S. workers when the unemployment rate rises.”134  
 A cost of unskilled Mexican immigrants entering the U.S. is that they will 
displace some low-skilled, American-born workers. However, Furchtgott-Roth (2013) 
noted that “the negative effect on [those] workers is much smaller than the positive 
effect for everyone else. The economy as a whole gains, with substantially more 
winners than losers.”135 This is because, as previously illustrated, most of the job 
positions that low-skilled migrants fill are undesired by most American citizens. Also, 
since less than 10 percent of Americans have less than a high school diploma, they 
could be compensated for increased job competition with transfer payments, which 
could go towards their education and skills attainment. 
 Another cost of low-skilled immigration is that it increases government 
spending. However, this relationship is complicated. On one hand, low-skilled 
immigrants pay taxes and make use of government services, whether they have legal 
status or not. They are ineligible for welfare benefits because they are not U.S. citizens. 
But on the other hand, they do use public health care and send their children to public 
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schools. On the whole, their fiscal impact appears to be negative.
136
 But even if it truly 
is negative, the correct response is not to attempt to put an end to illegal immigration. 
That has already been tried and failed, as will be discussed shortly. An example of a 
better solution was offered by Hanson (2012).
137
 He suggests that employers should 
internalize the fiscal costs of the low-skilled immigrants they employ by paying an 
immigrant labor payroll tax, which would fund their employees’ benefits. 
The Evolution of Mexico-U.S. Labor Migration  
The U.S. and Mexico have been linked politically, economically, and 
geographically through much of their histories. In fact, a large chunk of the U.S. used to 
be part of Mexico. When the U.S., under the leadership of President James K. Polk, 
defeated Mexico in the Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848, Mexico ceded nearly 
half of its territory to the U.S.
138
 As a result, many former Mexicans living in the ceded 
territory changed their nationality, but they still kept familial and friendship ties to their 
native country. These ties have held and grown over time. Throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century following the war, tens of thousands of Mexican laborers 
migrated to the U.S., attracted by temporary jobs in farming, mining and ranching.
139
 
Many returned home afterward, but not all. 
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The first large wave of Mexican workers entering the U.S. started at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
140
 The U.S.’s demand for Mexican labor rose 
dramatically when the U.S. entered World War I, and the Mexican government assisted 
the U.S. by agreeing to export Mexican labor so that more Americans could join the 
fight in Europe.
141
 However, after the war, U.S. society developed a very nativist 
attitude. In response, the U.S. established the Border Patrol in 1924.
142
  Although this 
made border crossings more dangerous and uncertain, the lure of high labor demand in 
the U.S. during the Roaring Twenties spurred continued immigration from Mexico.
143
 
However, things changed for the worse during the Great Depression. Not only did labor 
migration shore up, but also many Mexican laborers, including some legal residents and 
even citizens, were deported during the early 1930s, and Mexicans became the 
scapegoats for the economic woes and severe unemployment of the Depression.
144
 
Another wave of Mexican labor migration came in 1942 as part of the Bracero 
Program, which brought millions of Mexican guest workers to the U.S. to provide 
agricultural labor during World War II.
145
 The program ended in the 1960s, but at the 
same time favorable changes in U.S. immigration law and an economic downturn in 
Mexico encouraged more migration. However, the continuation of unauthorized 
immigration from Mexico during the economic recession of the 1970s soured the U.S.’s 
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attitude toward it, and led to increasingly restrictive immigration laws and more 
militarized border control. Yet despite the growing dangers and restrictions, in the 
1990s, approximately 350,000 unauthorized workers from Mexico came to the U.S. 
every year, totaling to over three million over that decade.
146
 Thus, we arrive at the 
present 11.7 million Mexican immigrants, 5.6 million of whom are unauthorized.
147
 
Changing economies, the Bracero program, the evolution of highly restrictive 
immigration policies, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other 
factors have altered the pattern and flow of Mexican immigration to the U.S. To 
understand how, it is helpful to more thoroughly discuss a handful of the most 
influential and transformative past agreements and legislation. In particular, it is 
insightful to discuss the Bracero program, changing immigration laws in the past fifty 
years, and the impact of NAFTA on immigration flows.  
The Bracero Program 
 The Bracero Program was a guest-worker program that lasted from 1942 until 
1964. It was the product of a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the U.S. in 1942. 
The U.S. signed the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement with Mexico in that year, which 
allowed the U.S. to import temporary migrant workers from Mexico to help with labor 
shortages, particularly in agriculture, during World War II. The agreement guaranteed 
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the humane treatment of workers (i.e. sanitation, food, and housing) and a 30 cent per 
hour minimum wage. Over its 22 year span, the program permitted around 4.6 million 
border crossings of Mexican laborers, called braceros, Spanish for manual laborers.
148
  
 During the war years, not very many braceros were admitted to the U.S. Even so, 
many American employers became dependent upon them. The agreement was 
formalized by Congress by Public Law 78 in 1951.
149
 It was also renegotiated with 
Mexico in that same year, and the new agreement established the U.S. government as 
the guarantor of labor contracts, as opposed to U.S. employers. From 1948 to 1964, an 
average of 200,000 braceros were admitted to the U.S. each year.
150
 Although the 
program was controversial in its time, it offered, at least in theory, many safeguards to 
protect workers, Mexican and domestic alike. These included: “guaranteed payment of 
at least the prevailing area wage received by native workers; employment for three-
fourths of the contract period; adequate, sanitary, and free housing; decent meals at 
reasonable prices; occupational insurance at employer's expense; and free transportation 
back to Mexico at the end of the contract.”151 However, in practice many of these rules 
were ignored to the benefit of employers and the detriment of laborers. Still, overall, the 
Bracero Program is regarded as a largely successful guest-worker program that supplied 
the U.S. agricultural industry with a dependable source of Mexican labor.
152
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How U.S. Immigration Policies Tightened the Border 
 Before modern border controls and immigration restrictions were enacted, the U.S. 
experienced a period of relative liberalism. In the 1960s, the civil rights movement called for reform 
of U.S. immigration policy. This led to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, also known 
as the Hart-Celler Act, which abolished nationality quotas but capped annual immigration from the 
western hemisphere at 120,000 people.
153
 It also created a preference system for family members of 
U.S. citizens. This Act was transformative because it increased the number of Latino, Asian, and 
African immigrants entering the U.S. and thereby changed the U.S.’s demographic make-up forever 
afterward. Following the passage of the Act, over 18 million people legally immigrated to the U.S., 
which was more than triple the number of immigrants admitted over the three decades preceding the 
Act.
154
 
 In 1978, the immigration caps set forth in the 1965 Immigration Act were replaced with a 
general annual limit of 290,000 that did not specify limits for specific world regions. In 1980, the 
Refugee Act lowered the annual limit of immigrants by 20,000, to 270,000.
155
The Immigration Act 
of 1990 expanded immigration by raising the annual limit to 700,000 immigrants for the first three 
years of the decade, and then 675,000 per year from then on.
156
 
 However, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act proved 
the first major stride in cutting back on immigration, particularly from Mexico. The Act redefined 
and reclassified certain crimes and allowed the law to be retroactively applicable so that immigrants 
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could be apprehended and deported more easily.
157
 It also increased the size of the Border Patrol. In 
addition, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act drastically cut legal 
permanent residents’ eligibility for many sources of welfare, such as TANF and Medicaid.158 
 Discouraged by Congress’s utter lack of progress in realizing immigration reform during his 
presidency, President Barack Obama took executive action in 2014 to delay the deportation of about 
5 million undocumented immigrants, particularly the parents of U.S. citizens or legal residents and 
“DREAMers”, children who migrated illegally with their parents.159 The policy also offered 
deportation deferrals and legal authorization to work to many of the undocumented immigrants who 
had resided in the U.S. for the past five years or longer.
160
 However, 26 states opposed the 
President’s actions and sued the U.S. in an effort to derail them. The Supreme Court will determine 
the final ruling on the issue in the summer of 2016. 
A common trend in the laws and policies surrounding immigration in the U.S. is 
that they fluctuate not with rise and fall in actual immigration flows, but with popular 
beliefs, which in the 1960s were relatively liberal, and since have grown increasingly 
conservative. 
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The Impact of NAFTA on Immigration Flows  
 NAFTA was supposed to yield better jobs and less poverty in Mexico, raising 
economic opportunities in that country nearer to the level offered in the U.S.
161
 By 
doing so, it was expected to reduce undocumented labor migration from Mexico to the 
U.S., and it was endorsed by former presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush.
162
 However, a 
recent study by Gandolfi et al. (2015), a group of economists, found that the real wage 
convergence that was achieved between the two countries in the 1990s was reversed in 
the 2000s.
163
 Therefore, NAFTA has proven insufficient in shrinking the real wage gap, 
suggesting that the liberalization of trade and investment is not enough to yield 
significant wage convergence. Meanwhile, the liberalization of labor mobility, provided 
by an “everything-including-labor” agreement could probably yield some convergence, 
although only institutional changes and a long run outlook will produce full real wage 
convergence.
164
 
 NAFTA may not have succeeded in effectively reducing the wage gap, but it has 
appeared to have urged an “emptying out of the Mexican countryside” and a growing 
Mexican migrant population in the U.S.
165
 The sources and destinations of migrants 
have diversified since 1990, with migrants now coming from all across Mexico and 
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moving to states outside the historically common destinations in western and 
southwestern U.S. This is in part because under NAFTA, Mexico’s collective farms 
were privatized, agricultural subsidies were eliminated, land was sold to foreigners, and 
Mexican food and seed markets were opened to foreign competition, all of which 
displaced many Mexican peasant farmers.
166
 They migrated seeking economic 
opportunities elsewhere, and many ended up in the U.S. despite increasingly restrictive 
border controls. Increased economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico did not 
succeed in reducing the pool of displaced workers in Mexico. This integration resulted 
in Mexico becoming the largest exporter in Latin America and the thirteenth-largest in 
the world, but it is also the world’s largest exporter of migrant workers, most of who 
travel to the U.S.
167
 This reality underlines NAFTA’s failure to reduce economic 
asymmetries between Mexico and the U.S.  
Proposals for a New Bracero Program 
 The closest policy that the U.S. has to a Bracero Program nowadays is the H-2 Program, 
comprised of H-2A and H-2B visas. An H-2A visa allows an immigrant to enter the U.S. for 
temporary agricultural work, while an H-2B visa allows an immigrant entry for temporary 
nonagricultural work. Workers with these visas are supposed to be protected by U.S. wage laws, 
workers’ compensation, and other basic standards. One significant advantage that these workers 
have over undocumented migrants is that employers are required to provide them with housing.
168
 
                                                          
 
166
 Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Douglas S. Massey, “Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in 
Mexico-U.S. Migration,” The Annals of the American Academy 610 (2007): 99.  
167
 Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto Márquez Covarrubias, “The Reshaping of Mexican Labor Exports 
under NAFTA: Paradoxes and Challenges,” International Migration Review 41.3 (2007): 656.  
168
 Jula, “Report: For Migrant Workers.” 
 
 
52 
 
However, guest workers’ vulnerability and social isolation means they can easily become victims of 
exploitation and labor trafficking. That concern aside for the moment, the program does appear 
somewhat successful despite controversy and criticism since the number of temporary labor 
migrants has grown in recent years. In 1990, Mexican workers received only 6,573 H-2A and H-2B 
visas, but by 2013, the number of visas they received was 111,670.
169
 
 However, the application process that an American business has to go through to get 
temporary workers is long, tedious, and expensive.
170
 Agricultural employers argue that its 
restrictions are overbearing, while farmworker advocates protest its insufficient protections for 
domestic workers and migrants.
171
 Significant changes have not been made to the program since the 
passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
172
 The Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Bill of 2013 was an as-yet unsuccessful bill proposing 
immigration reform. One of its major provisions “would have offered legal status to undocumented 
farmworkers and created a temporary-worker program for U.S. agriculture to replace the H-2A 
program.”173 The bill also would have increased government spending on securing the border, and 
offered a path to citizenship for many of the country’s undocumented immigrants.174 Unfortunately, 
this bipartisan bill died in the House of Representatives after passing through the Senate. However, 
something like it would be a good start to achieving significant immigration reform and legalizing 
temporary migration flows between the U.S. and Mexico. 
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The U.S. and its neighbors are already enjoying some economic benefits from 
labor migration, despite the legal and physical barriers to migration. As of 2012, over 
16 percent of the U.S. labor force was represented by foreign-born workers – 25 million 
of them, and about 38 percent of these workers were from Mexico and Central America, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
175
 
One of the most evident economic benefits of greater labor migration to Mexico 
and individual Mexican families, as well as any other migrant-sending countries, is 
increased remittances. Total remittances sent to Mexico in 2014 were $24 billion, which 
represented about 2 percent of the country’s GDP, according to the World Bank.176 The 
degree to which remittances can increase depends upon the scale of labor migration 
permitted, but it is safe to say that any liberalization will result in improved standards of 
living for many Mexican families and communities with loved ones taking advantage of 
new opportunities to work temporarily in the U.S. Indeed, even minor liberalization in 
international labor mobility would massively support the development of developing 
countries.
177
 
Consequently, a new Bracero Program-inspired guest worker program between 
the U.S. and Mexico would be fruitful for both countries. Although Mexican 
immigration to the U.S. has not been growing in recent years like it has in the past, 
existing immigration laws and programs like the H-2A and H-2B visa programs are far 
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from sufficient in handling the labor migration flows. While those programs invite 
about a hundred thousand Mexican workers to enter the U.S. legally for temporary work, 
well over five million Mexican immigrants remain undocumented. Creating a guest 
worker program that included most undocumented migrants would not only help the 
U.S. and American businesses keep track of the foreign labor supply, but it would also 
offer these immigrations a life beyond the legal shadows with greater workers’ 
protections, minimum wage guarantees, and potentially other amenities like housing. 
Conclusion  
Immigration reform of any shape or size is highly contested not just in the U.S., 
but in most countries around the world. However, the proposal for a bilateral temporary 
labor migration agreement between the U.S. and Mexico could be separated from the 
heated debate over immigration since it is not about immigration that results in 
permanent residence or naturalization. This proposal is about achieving mutual 
economic gains through the offer and acceptance of affordable, unskilled labor on 
bilaterally agreed terms. Importantly, this idea is not unprecedented. Many, if not most, 
OECD countries have developed seasonal migration programs; for example, the 
Recognized Seasonal Employer program between New Zealand and several Pacific 
island states has had large positive development impacts on migrant households as well 
as economic gains for New Zealand firms.
178
 The success of the U.S.’s own Bracero 
Program can be revitalized and enhanced by ideas from newer programs, and allow for 
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the inexpensive provision of cheap, unskilled labor to the agricultural and other 
business industries in the U.S. Clearly, foreign labor is already vital to the daily 
functioning of the U.S. economy. An agreement establishing an exchange of relatively 
cheap, unskilled labor in return for economic opportunity between the U.S. and Mexico 
could offer increased economic gains.  
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Chapter IV: The Empowerment of Migrants and their Communities 
 This chapter explores the human side of the debate over international labor 
mobility and attempts to provide a framework for how migrant labor programs can and 
should work. We have heretofore explored primarily the economic benefits, as well as 
some social benefits, of a legal expansion of international labor migration, and we have 
looked in-depth at the situation of Mexican migrants to the U.S. This chapter provides 
additional evidence that supports the creation of effective, bilateral migrant labor 
programs by portraying the major issues with the U.S.’s current immigration policies 
and assessing the merits of other migrant labor programs in the world.  
This chapter begins with an exploration of the conditions faced by documented 
labor migrants under the U.S.’s H-2 Program and undocumented labor migrants in the 
U.S., arguing that highly restrictive immigration laws, the poor enforcement of legal 
protections for workers’ rights, and negative societal perceptions harm the well-being of 
migrants. Existing U.S. immigration laws and border militarization force many migrants 
to enter the country illegally, while the relative few who are accepted by the H-2 
Program are exposed to very exploitative conditions not unlike those faced by the 
undocumented. Bilateral agreements establishing guest worker programs could offer 
labor migrants wider legal avenues for migration and protection of their human rights, 
as well as a (marginally) higher social status. This chapter then assesses the 
effectiveness of such migrant labor programs by analyzing existing programs in New 
Zealand and Canada, extracting useful lessons from each that the U.S. could adopt in 
order to revitalize or re-envision its own migrant labor policies and guarantee the 
protection of the human rights of the migrants it receives.  
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Life as an “Illegal Alien”  
What is it like to be an undocumented migrant laborer in the U.S.? How could 
these migrants benefit from a large, well-regulated labor migration program between 
their home country and the U.S.? The answer to the first question, in brief, is this: 
undocumented migrant laborers are more likely to experience a life plagued by 
exploitation, fear, invisibility, poverty, debt, suffering, and isolation. With regard to the 
second question, a well-regulated migrant labor program would resolve the inhumane 
conditions that migrants currently endure, ensuring them legal protections, workers’ 
rights, basic benefits and entitlements, and human dignity.  
Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Border  
Just the act of entering the U.S. can be an ordeal for undocumented migrants. In 
fact, it is probably the biggest ordeal they undergo, risking their lives and spending 
thousands of dollars on travel expenses such as hiring a smuggler, or coyote, whose 
services typically cost anywhere from $1,000 to $10,000.
179
 It is worth noting that 
today’s circumstances were not always the reality. Up until 1996, most Mexican 
migrants used to travel back and forth between California and their hometowns in 
Mexico with relative ease and greater frequency. However, since then the U.S. has 
constructed a wall between the U.S. and Mexico along the California border.
180
 In 
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addition, the U.S. tripled spending for border enforcement beginning in 1993, initiating 
a largely ineffective, yet ongoing “prevention through deterrence” strategy vis-à-vis 
migrants.
181
 According to the Migration Policy Institute, by 2012 the U.S. was spending 
around $18 billion a year on border enforcement – about 24 percent more than was 
spent on all other federal criminal-law-enforcement agencies combined.
182
 This build-
up of walls and patrols has pushed migrants to attempt border crossings in more isolated 
areas, including the deserts of Texas, Arizona and New Mexico, which has sharply 
increased the danger and cost associated with a trip. To avoid the Border Patrol 
checkpoints located throughout the borderlands, migrants’ journeys take much longer 
than before, increasing their exposure to life-threatening dangers like dehydration and 
heatstroke.
183
  
Policy changes over the last two decades have increased the physical and 
financial costs of migration without affecting the underlying push-and-pull factors that 
attract migrants to the U.S. in the first place. Consequently, migrants have continued to 
travel to the U.S. despite the growing dangers. Before Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act in 1986, the number of deaths that was associated with people 
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trying to enter the U.S. was negligible.
184
 That Act increased enforcement at the two 
traditional points of entry, which were between Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juarez-
El Paso, and was followed by even greater enforcement operations initiated in 1993. By 
2007, almost five hundred people were known to be dying every year while attempting 
to cross the border in search of opportunities, though the absence of an official record-
keeping system means that the exact numbers are unknown.
185
 Also, according to the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, about 2,350 people called to be rescued along the 
border in 2013 due to extreme heat.
186
  
The U.S. can now boast more than 21,000 Border Patrol agents, in addition to 
miles upon miles of reinforced walls, drones, and watchtowers.
187
 As of 2012, the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) contractor 
had completed just over 650 miles of fencing, about 300 miles in the form of vehicle 
barriers and 350 miles of a more impervious type of fencing called ‘pedestrian fence’.188 
In 2013, the U.S. Senate approved the Border Security, Economic Opportunity and 
Immigration Modernization Act that would require a minimum of 700 miles of 
pedestrian fencing along the border and add 20,000 new border agents, but the bill 
failed to make it past the House of Representatives. Although this Act did not pass, it is 
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worth noting that its pro-border enforcement provisions are standard in current plans for 
new immigration legislation.  
In addition, the Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan research group based in 
Washington, found that the federal government spent almost $18 billion on immigration 
enforcement in 2012 alone.
189
 The government’s two main immigration enforcement 
agencies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the CBP, employ more than 
80,000 people. Meanwhile, labor enforcement agencies like the Wage and Hour 
Division of the Department of Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, among many others, employ fewer than 9,000, meaning there are 
nowhere near enough inspectors to protect migrant workers from the abuses of their 
employers, but there are plenty of Border Patrol agents to deport them.
190
 
For all of the U.S.’s ongoing unilateral militarization of its border with Mexico, 
it has failed to realize its goal of reducing the flow of undocumented migrants into the 
U.S. Rather, it has succeeded in radically increasing the risks and costs of crossing the 
border by redirecting the flow of migrants to remote, perilous regions, tripling the death 
rate along the border.
191
 The beefed up Border Patrol has also had the effect of 
increasing the duration of migrants’ stay in the U.S. because it takes migrants longer to 
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recover the costs of their journey to the U.S., and it takes additional time to save up for 
a return trip home.
192
  
The increase in border enforcement has also ultimately heightened the 
vulnerability of migrants to extortion by smugglers and kidnapping by criminal gangs. 
The story of the first border crossing attempt taken by a Mexican migrant named Allan 
Modesto Martinez Alvarez, known as “Tiger” by his friends, illustrates this: 
“A coyote guided [Tiger and his group] into Texas. But once on the other side, 
the group they were traveling with was taken hostage at gunpoint and locked 
inside a building. All the men were brutally beaten and told they’d be killed, 
says Ismael [Tiger’s brother]. Following orders to acquire ransom money, Tiger 
called his mother [Betty]. Fearing for his life, Ismael and Betty scraped together 
as much money as they could find. With help from several other family 
members, they sent nearly $10,000. Both Tiger and Christian were released on a 
road somewhere near the Texas town of McAllen.”193 
 Mexico’s National Commission on Human Rights estimates that around 20,000 
migrants are kidnapped and held for ransom every year along their journey north to the 
U.S as well as on the U.S. side of the border.
194
 Some other estimates are much higher. 
Migrants are viewed as another revenue source besides the drug trade for Mexico’s 
criminal gangs. The gangs and cartels diversify their operations by running smuggling 
networks and taking migrants hostage. Plainly stated, if the U.S. offered more legal 
avenues by which undocumented migrants could enter the U.S. for temporary work, 
then thousands of migrants would not have to risk their lives by attempting illegal 
border crossings. They could be assured safe passage in and out of the country. Given 
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how ineffectual border enforcement has proven to be and how negative its influence has 
been on migrants’ safety, the U.S. should consider a different approach. 
Health and Well-being 
 Undocumented workers in the U.S. are ineligible for health care coverage under 
the Affordable Care Act. Their fear of contact with government agencies and 
deportation as well as their encounter with the barriers of mobility, culture, and 
language make it very difficult for undocumented migrants to access health care.
195
 At 
the same time, migrants work in some of the most high-risk industries, such as 
agriculture, construction, forestry, and fishing, and they have higher fatality and injury 
rates than workers in other sectors.
196
 Research by economists Orrenius and Zavodny 
(2009) has shown that the difference between immigrants, both documented and 
undocumented, and U.S. citizens in average industry fatality rates was 1.79 deaths per 
100,000 workers, and the difference in average industry injury rates was 8.19 per 
10,000 workers.
197
 This implies “an excess mortality of 358 immigrants per year 
compared with the number of deaths if immigrants had the same distribution across 
industries as natives… [and] an excess of 16,380 non-fatal injuries involving at least 
one day away from work among immigrants.”198 This indicates that immigrants work in 
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much more dangerous industries than American citizens, and they are more likely to 
suffer on-the-job injuries and fatalities. 
 Part of the problem is sheer negligence on the part of employers, as revealed by 
these types of tragedies: 
“A migrant farm worker died of heat stroke after picking tobacco in 110 degree 
weather in North Carolina. His internal body temperature was recorded at 108 
degrees. A 14-year-old undocumented worker was partially decapitated and 
crushed by machinery in a plant in Tennessee. The youth, who had presented 
forged documents indicating that he was 19 years old, had received no safety 
training.”199 
Beyond employers’ neglect and apathy, the biggest part of the problem with 
migrants’ health is their insufficient access to medical care. Only around 5 percent of 
undocumented migrants have health insurance in the U.S., and their immigration status 
means that they do not qualify for Medicare or Medicaid.
200
 There are health centers 
targeted toward migrant communities in the U.S., and in 2013 the health centers that 
received funding from the Migrant Health Center Program served nearly 800,000 
patients.
201
 These migrant health clinics are imperfect, dealing with problems such as 
language barriers, racism, hefty copays, and insufficient funding.
202
 Also, given that 
there were 11.3 million undocumented migrants in the U.S. as of 2014, and knowing 
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that none of them are covered by the ACA, it is evident that migrants are vastly 
underserviced in health care.
203
 
Other issues affecting migrants’ well-being include food insecurity. A Public 
Health Report estimated that almost half of migrant farmworker households are food 
insecure, with food insecurity being more prevalent among households with children 
than those without.
204
 The study also found that food insecurity is over four times as 
prevalent among farmworker households than among the U.S. population as a whole.
205
 
Social Isolation 
Migrants commonly face social isolation. This is arguably even truer for migrant 
farmworkers than migrants in some other occupations, given their rural positions. 
Regarding migrant farmworkers in the U.S., 68 percent were born in Mexico, and 15 
percent are Central Americans or indigenous Mexicans.
206
 Indigenous workers are 
placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy and endure the most social suffering, such 
as ostracization and more difficult jobs.
207
 Research has shown that one in four migrant 
farmworkers “experienced an episode of one or more mental health disorders such as 
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stress, depression, or anxiety in their lifetime.”208 The absence of social support 
resources in the lives of migrant workers can result in depression and anxiety.
209
 Their 
ability to form non-kin-based social relationships in new places tends to be limited by 
their long work hours and lack of a means of transportation.
210
 A study conducted in 
North Carolina surveyed 300 farmworkers and found that 28 percent reported 
experiencing elevated levels of depressive symptoms, and 5 percent reported daily or 
weekly moderate to severe musculoskeletal pain.
211
  
A qualitative study among Mexican immigrant men found that the self-reported 
causes of depression included separation from family, discrimination, long hours, 
multiple jobs, unemployment, low wages, social isolation, and a change in substance 
use.
212
 Self-reported remedies of depressive symptoms included drinking and taking 
drugs, seeking professional help, increased socializing, and reuniting with family.
213
 In 
fact, a study that interviewed 125 male migrant farmworkers in North Carolina 
discovered that 30 percent of their panel screened positive for alcohol dependence.
214
 
Another study that interviewed 5,826 people in Mexico found that respondents who 
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migrated or who had family who migrated to the U.S. were more likely to use alcohol or 
drugs at least once in their lifetime and engage in substance abuse.
215
 
Migrants must somehow cope with all the issues discussed thus far and more, 
including workplace exploitation, which will be examined in the subsequent section. 
Succinctly put, expansive, well-regulated labor migration programs could help alleviate 
migrants’ fears, protect them from the current dangers of border crossings and 
exploitation, guarantee them a minimum wage and standard of living, and offer them 
basic rights like access to health care. Next we will look into what life is like as a 
guestworker in the U.S. with a H-2A or H-2B visa. 
Life as a Guestworker under the U.S.’s Current H-2 Program 
 Not only should the U.S. open up its tight immigration policies, but the country 
also needs to take a close look at the serious problems with its existing, though very 
limited, guestworker program, the H-2 Program. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
this program, which is overseen by the U.S. Department of Labor, is comprised of two 
different programs, the H-2A and H-2B. The H-2A program allows agricultural 
employers to hire foreign workers on temporary work permits, while the H-2B program 
allows non-agricultural employers to do likewise.
216
 In 2011, employers brought around 
106,000 guestworkers into the U.S., 55,000 for agricultural labor and 51,000 for non-
agricultural labor, particularly landscaping and construction; about 80 percent were 
                                                          
 
215
 Guilherme Borges, Maria Elena Medina-Mora, Joshua Breslau, and Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola, “The 
Effect of Migration to the United States on Substance Use Disorders among Returned Mexican Migrants 
and Families of Migrants,” American Journal of Public Health 97.10 (2007): 1848-9.  
216
 “Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
<https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers>.  
 
 
67 
 
Mexican.
217
 A report by the Southern Poverty Law Center found that these 
guestworkers are “systematically exploited and abused,” and the abuses they uncovered 
were “too common to blame on a few ‘bad apple’ employers.”218  
 H-2 Program guestworkers are not participants in the U.S.’s large, competitive 
labor market. Instead, they are bound to the employers who sponsor them, and they are 
powerless in the face of mistreatment, lacking access to legal resources and living under 
the threat of deportation or blacklisting.
219
 Some of the most common ways 
guestworkers are exploited include being cheated out of wages, being held captive by 
employers who steal their documentation, being subjected to human trafficking, being 
forced to live in squalor without basic amenities, and being denied medical benefits for 
workplace injuries.
220
 The H-2A Program defines the minimum wage for guestworkers 
and provides them with legal protections, including of their health and safety. It also 
entitles them to free housing, workers’ compensation benefits, reimbursement for travel 
costs to and from their home countries, and eligibility for federally-funded legal 
services for employment issues.
221
 The H-2B Program’s legal protections and 
entitlements are not as robust. All of these promises exist on paper, but are too often not 
evident in practice. 
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What does this injustice look like in practice? Cirilio, a Guatemalan migrant 
worker to the U.S., has a story that shines light on the major problems and oversights 
existing in the U.S.’s current labor migration program: 
“Cirilio is one of about 85 workers from Guatemala who traveled to the 
southeastern United States in 2012 to bale pine straw and harvest blueberries. 
Making only about $10 to $40 a week in coffee production in Guatemala, Cirilio 
was eager for the opportunity to earn higher wages in the United States.  
Hoping to earn enough money to be able to pay off loans for his wife’s medical 
treatment as well as save up for a house, Cirilio decided to migrate. That decision was 
far from easy, and it put him deeper in debt: 
Cirilio took out additional loans to pay for the $2,000 in travel, visa and 
recruitment expenses. When Cirilio arrived in the United States, his employers 
confiscated his passport and withheld it for the duration of his employment. 
Cirilio initially worked long hours baling pine straw, often leaving the house 
before dawn and working until sunset. Cirilio was never reimbursed for his 
travel or visa expenses, and his wages were further reduced by excessive 
deductions: Employers automatically deducted $200 from his check each month 
for rent and transportation, and Cirilio spent about $40 to $60 of his own money 
per week on string used for tying pine straw bales.  
Cirilio’s employers failed to adhere to the legal requirements within the H-2A 
Program, such as offering reimbursement for immigration travel costs, and they 
essentially chained him to their employ by taking his visa. They further exploited his 
labor by steeply reducing his earnings. Even so, those were relatively good times for 
Cirilio, since things became even worse: 
Cirilio’s situation became even more desperate when he began working for a 
blueberry grower. “After the first week or so, the work really slowed down. The 
employer had too many workers and there was hardly anything for us to do.” 
Legally prohibited from seeking work elsewhere, Cirilio was at the mercy of his 
employer. “We just sat around the house day after day. We were desperate for 
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work, but the grower warned us that if we tried to work for anyone else, he 
would call Immigration and have us deported. We could hardly afford to buy 
food. On a few occasions, we went out into the woods to look for herbs to eat.” 
While Cirilio was in the United States, his wife in Guatemala gave birth to their 
son, who died soon after birth. “Since I wasn’t making any money, I couldn’t 
even give him a proper funeral. I was so sad and frustrated.” As his wife’s health 
deteriorated after the loss, Cirilio told the grower that he wanted to return to 
Guatemala to care for his wife. “He told me that I couldn’t leave because he 
needed me to stay on the farm and work.” Cirilio stayed for a little while longer, 
but the work did not pick up. “I felt trapped. My debts were mounting, but I was 
scared to leave the farm without my passport. I didn’t want to get deported and 
ruin my chances of getting another visa in the future.” Despite his fears, Cirilio 
eventually felt compelled to abandon the farm, leaving his passport behind. “I 
just wanted to go back to Guatemala but I couldn’t even afford the plane 
ticket.”222 
Cirilio’s story highlights many of the worst failings of the H-2 Program. The 
basic amenities, rights, and legal protections that the program assures guestworkers are 
frequently virtually nonexistent in practice. This comes as no surprise given deficient 
government enforcement of the program and vastly insufficient monitoring of H-2 
employers by the Department of Labor and other agencies.
223
 Either the H-2 Program 
should be revamped or a new guestworker program should be introduced in the U.S., 
such that the wide power disparity between employers and guestworkers can be 
decreased. In order to be protected from abuse and exploitation, guestworkers need laws 
and regulations to be strengthened and, most importantly, actually enforced. 
Guestworkers should also have easy access to federally-funded legal services. They 
should enjoy the same basic rights, protections, and benefits as any other person 
working in the U.S., including the right to unionize, and be free from abuse, fear of 
retaliation, exorbitant indebtedness, squalid housing, cheated wages, virtual captivity, 
                                                          
 
222
 Ibid., 24. 
223
 Ibid., 38-9. 
 
 
70 
 
and untreated injuries. Essentially, migrant workers should be provided with all the 
rights and entitlements that the H-2 Program promises them. They should also have 
greater freedom to move among employers while working in the U.S. 
In sum, the ideal program would be a comprehensive, large scale, bilateral guest 
worker program that incorporates employers across industries in order to match labor 
supply with demand while protecting workers’ rights and defending their wellbeing. In 
pursuit of this goal, policymakers can choose to upgrade the H-2 Program, or they can 
choose to scrap it and create a larger, more audacious program. No matter the route they 
take, policymakers should take into account the advice offered by other countries’ 
experiences with their own migrant labor programs. How have other countries’ 
programs succeeded where the U.S.’s H-2 Program has failed, and what are the 
components of a successful migrant labor program? That is what we will turn to next. 
Lessons from Existing Labor Migration Programs 
In developing its own modern migrant labor program, the U.S. need not start 
from scratch. Other countries, such as New Zealand and Canada, have developed such 
programs, and their policies and outcomes can provide guidance and warnings to the 
U.S. 
New Zealand’s RSE Program 
 New Zealand introduced its Recognized Seasonal Employers (RSE) Scheme in 
2007 with the dual purpose of filling seasonal labor shortages in its horticulture and 
viticulture industries with unskilled foreign laborers and spurring development in 
 
 
71 
 
sending countries. This program allows New Zealand employers to apply for RSE status, 
after which they can apply to give seasonal positions to foreign workers if there are no 
domestic applicants. Currently, seven Pacific countries hold Inter-Agency 
Understandings with New Zealand.
224
 These are Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Papua 
New Guinea, Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. To qualify for a visa under the RSE 
work category, an aspiring migrant must be age 18 or older and have a job offer from an 
RSE-approved employer.
225
 A visa permits a stay of up to seven to nine months. 
Employers must pay half of their employees’ international airfare and guarantee access 
to suitable housing, health services and insurance, translation services, and cultural 
activities.
226
 The RSE program allows up to 9,000 foreign workers to be imported per 
year. 
 A study by the Center for Research and Analysis of Migration confirmed that 
the RSE has succeeded in offering new opportunities for relatively poor, rural, and 
unskilled Tongans to work in New Zealand, suggesting that the program is pro-poor in 
its recruitment.
227
 That in turn bodes well for the program’s development impact on 
sending countries because by engaging the poor, they can boost rural village economies 
and increase human capital attainment.  
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 The RSE program has proven successful since its introduction in 2007 and, as of 
2013, is providing around 10 percent of the peak seasonal workforce in the horticulture 
and viticulture industries.
228
 Over 100 employers are participating in the program. One 
employer is Vailima Orchards, which recruits 80 workers each season for apple-picking. 
Since they began participating in the RSE program, Vailima’s production has increased 
by about 33%, thanks to their ready access to labor.
229
 In addition, Vailima teaches 
migrants’ new skills, giving them the opportunity to accumulate human capital, on top 
of the enormous benefit of a steady income. In this way, the RSE program has been able 
to offer a supply of labor where there is demand for it in a way that is fair and beneficial 
to all parties. 
 The U.S. could benefit by replicating certain aspects of this program. In 
particular, enforcing the guarantees of housing, compensation for travel costs, and 
health care, among others, for migrant workers is very significant. The emphasis on 
hiring poor, rural, and unskilled workers from neighboring countries is also worthy of 
emulation. However, this program potentially suffers from the same problem as the H-2 
Program in that migrants are bound to a single employer and thereby vulnerable to 
exploitation. 
Canada’s SAWP 
 Since 1974, Canada has had a bilateral agreement with Mexico, establishing the 
Canadian-Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP). The program was 
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originally introduced in 1966 between Canada and Jamaica, but now includes Mexico 
and other Caribbean countries. This program is similar to the Bracero Program, the 
bilateral migrant labor agreement between the U.S. and Mexico that was in place from 
1942 until 1964, in that it hires Mexican and Caribbean workers on a temporary basis to 
fill labor shortages during planting and harvesting seasons when domestic labor fails to 
meet demand. The Canadian Program, however, has several distinguishing features. It is 
smaller, it guarantees better working and living conditions, and it is more bureaucratic 
in its recruitment practices.
230
 Workers are eligible for the Canada Pension Plan and 
some employment insurance benefits. The program is run jointly with the participating 
nations; for instance, the Mexican Ministry of Labor plays the role of recruiter, and it 
negotiates wages, subsidies, working conditions, meals, and other concerns with 
Canada’s Department of Human Resources Development.231 Farmers must offer their 
workers a minimum of 240 work hours over a total of six weeks. They must also 
provide free housing, cooking facilities, provincial health coverage, provincial 
workplace safety insurance, and pay the same wage as that given to Canadians 
performing the same labor.
232
 Workers are generally low- to medium-skilled 
farmworkers, and they are allowed to stay for up to eight months per year.
233
 
 Most Mexican workers who take part in this program are male, married, and 
over 25 years old. They leave their families in Mexico and work in Canada for an 
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average of 17 to 20 weeks.
234
 The program has recently experienced significant growth 
in the numbers of both migrants and employers that it connects.
235
 In 2010, 15,809 
Mexican workers took part in the program, compared to 203 in 1974. By 2015, about 
17,000 seasonal workers were employed in Canada through the program.
236
 This 
program offers Canadian horticultural employers a ready source of labor, and it gives 
foreign workers the chance to earn Canadian wages, send remittances back home, and 
spur economic development there.  
This program, like any other, is imperfect. It could do more to guarantee access 
to health services, training, safety, adequate accommodations, decent hours, and so on, 
and make it easier for workers to transfer between farms and make valid complaints. 
However, it has and continues to do an excellent job at providing a well-regulated, 
albeit small avenue for economic opportunity for labor migrants in Canada. The success 
of the program is two-sided. First, the program has been addressing the critical shortage 
of domestic agricultural workers in Canada for the past half century. Without the 
reliable source of seasonal laborers that SAWP provides, many farmers would go out of 
business; indeed, the program has become indispensable, benefiting around 1,450 farms 
in 2015 alone.
237
 On the other side, migrant workers and their families’ standard of 
living improve, and they are able to afford their children’s education and pursue their 
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own higher education or skills acquisition. Around 80 percent of the seasonal workers 
in the program return on repeat contracts because of the higher wages.
238
  
The U.S. should assess how this program in Canada, as well as the RSE program 
in New Zealand, has been so successful, and incorporate its best features, including 
worker’s rights and guarantees, in an effort to revamp the H-2 Program or develop a 
more ambitious migrant labor program. The U.S. should not have any difficulty 
establishing similar bilateral agreements as Canada’s and New Zealand’s; enforcement 
and protection of workers’ rights will be much more difficult and should be one of the 
U.S.’s central concerns.   
Conclusion 
 The existing guestworker program in the U.S., the H-2 Program, is substandard, 
and the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border has resulted in untold suffering of 
migrant laborers. Migrants, legal or not, are often exploited, cheated of their wages, 
mistreated, and they are powerless to fight for their rights. Millions of migrants have 
entered the U.S. illegally in the past few decades, searching for greater economic 
opportunities than those available in their home country. But the life they find in the 
U.S., if they manage to survive crossing the border, is often degrading, inhumane, 
lonely, depressing, and stressful. This situation is explicitly unjust. 
U.S. policymakers need to look at other countries’ guestworker programs, like 
New Zealand’s and Canada’s, and use those experiences, along with lessons learned 
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from our existing migration policies, to develop a more effective policy strategy for 
America in the 21
st
 century. The U.S.’s H-2 Program offers migrants great resources 
and protections in letter, but not in practice. New Zealand and Canada are better at 
guaranteeing their migrant workers’ basic rights, including housing and a minimum 
wage, and the U.S. needs to learn how to accomplish this. Temporary labor migrants 
should have a straightforward, legal pathway into the U.S., where they can answer the 
demand for their relatively unskilled, inexpensive labor. In return for their hard work, 
migrants deserve to have their human and workers’ rights fully protected, and that is 
where the U.S. needs to work the hardest. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 This study argues that greater international labor mobility offers large potential 
economic and social benefits to developed and developing countries alike. Although the 
development of bilateral and multilateral expansive, well-enforced migrant labor 
programs poses many challenges and does not offer a complete solution to the world’s 
many woes, it is truly a worthwhile endeavor. Wider avenues for legal labor migration 
between the poor and the rich countries of the world could generate greater economic 
growth and development, giving developed countries the cheap, low-skilled labor they 
demand and developing countries the opportunity to take advantage of wide wage 
differentials and earn more for their labor abroad. Further, such avenues could provide 
sorely needed social benefits, particularly for labor migrants, including the protection of 
workers’ rights, freedom from exploitation and the fear of deportation, and the ability to 
cross the border and visit family with much greater ease and safety. Meanwhile, 
whatever costs migrant labor programs might impose on recipient countries, such as the 
suppression of low-skilled citizens’ wages or increased fiscal spending on welfare, can 
be easily mitigated by compensating low-skilled citizens and restricting migrants’ 
access to welfare. The economic benefits of labor migrants far outweigh the costs that 
may be associated with them. 
Even with current restrictive immigration policies and all the dangers they imply, 
international labor migration is a large and growing feature of the global economic 
landscape. Rather than spending billions of dollars in ultimately futile attempts to deter 
and deport labor migrants, the developed world should do with labor what it has done 
with capital and trade; in other words, liberalization should be paramount. As Lant 
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Pritchett has noted, “the world is becoming more connected in every other way – trade 
in goods, movements of capital, communications, travel…If everything else is 
globalized, then why not labor?”239 Why not, indeed. 
 The intent of this study is to encourage people, and policymakers in particular, 
to reconsider existing immigration policies and the current push for greater restrictions 
and border security. This study has shown that there is another route we can take, but it 
is not without challenges. It will take effort to improvement enforcement of existing 
laws, information for people to understand the benefits of expanding migrant labor 
programs, and popular support to encourage policymakers to enact the necessary 
legislation. If the world starts small, with bilateral agreements between neighboring and 
historically-affiliated countries, and if the U.S. becomes one of the main leaders of the 
movement for greater international labor mobility, then one day there may be a world 
where the movement of people is as free as that of capital or trade. However, this 
utopian outcome is not needed for the world to reap large benefits from greater labor 
mobility as even a marginal increase would yield impressive economic and social gains.  
Labor migrants are plentiful, demand for their labor is present, and benefits are 
shared – the right ingredients are present for international labor migration to expand. 
What is now needed most is political willpower and public conversation on the merits 
of labor migration and the necessity for immigration reform. For the sake of labor 
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migrants and economic progress in the developing world, this study will hopefully help 
spark a conversation that is long overdue. 
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